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1.   INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  explores  whether  it  would  be  commercially  interesting  for 
historical postal operators to price the “postal last mile”. By introducing the 
receiver  pays  principle  it  identifies  an  approach  which  could  lead  to  a 
number  of  innovations  in  service  arrangements  and  in  financing  the 
universal service obligation (USO). 
 Indeed, the way the postal last mile for the delivery of lettermail
2 has 
been defined, serviced and priced so far has historical origins and, as yet, has 
seldom been called into question. Today this question is attracting increased 
attention, driven by three considerations: first, mail volumes appear to 
decline, at least in the traditional letter market, leading to diminishing scale 
effects.  Secondly,  the  changing  consumer  behavior  resulting  from  new 
information and communication te chnologies is reducing the pressure on 
speedy delivery and prompting a redefinition of what constitutes a universal 
postal service. Thirdly, there is a growing debate about whether or not access 
to the incumbent’s distribution network is to be granted to competitors. 
Against this background and given the cost-sensitiveness of the last mile, 
postal  operators  are  increasingly  seeking  ways  to  reduce  costs  at  the 
distribution end of the value chain. They typically do so by delivering more 
efficiently or by reducing service levels. In contrast to these approaches, we 
look for possibilities to give more value to the last mile by introducing a 
delivery  fee  that  receivers  would  have  to  pay  when  choosing  traditional 
home delivery. In conjunction, we discuss a new way of financing the USO. 
This paper models – for the first time, to the best of our knowledge– 
recipient pricing in the postal sector and tests it with Swiss data. In Section 
2,  we  briefly  consider  the  question  of  the  last  mile  in  other  network 
                                                 
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. The authors would like 
to thank M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer for their helpful comments. 
2 To facilitate discussion, this paper focuses on letter mail, considering that parcels 
have a somewhat different last mile problem. However, the models discussed here 
are, in principle, also applicable to parcels delivery. Exploring the “last mile” in the postal sector  page 2 
 
 
industries to get a better understanding of the last mile issue and of whether 
and how it differs from other sectors. In Section 3, we look at USO service 
levels:  as  mail  distribution  remains  a  universal  service  obligation  it  is 
necessary  to  explore  the  leeway  an  incumbent  actually  possesses  when 
exploring new options for the postal last mile. Section 4 describes principles, 
conditions, and fields of application of the receiver pays principle (RPP). We 
also  outline  its  future  potential  for  service  level  differentiation  and  for 
financing the USO. Section 5 presents and calibrates the model by looking at 
its implications in terms of both operators’ profit and overall welfare. We 
present and discuss our results in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.  
 
 
2.   THE PROBLEM OF THE LAST MILE 
The  “last  mile”  is  a  typical  concept  of  network  industries  such  as 
telecommunications, electricity, gas, and others. The last mile became an 
issue  mainly  because  of  the  liberalization  of  these  industries,  where  the 
owners of the networks have given or have been forced to give access to 
their networks. We briefly consider the debates in the telecommunications 
and electricity sectors and compare them with the postal sector. 
In the telecommunications sector, the last mile is defined by the physical 
cable  that  links  the  individual  household  to  the  dispatching  central.  For 
economic reasons, it is generally not deemed efficient to duplicate this last 
mile.  Therefore,  the  European  Commission  and  national  regulators  have 
forced the historical operators to open up their last miles to competitors, who 
rent  the  last  mile  at  a  regulated  price.  More  recently,  technological 
alternatives  such  as  television  cable  or  broadband  wireless  access  have 
emerged. It is therefore being increasingly debated whether access to the 
historical  operator’s  last  mile  should  be  regulated  at  all,  or  whether 
technological and commercial competition is sufficient to serve consumers’ 
interests  and  by  doing  so  increase  welfare.  Most  suppliers  price  their 
services with two-part tariffs (TPT)
3. TPT means that the consumer pays a 
                                                 
3 Although the TPT principle was known long before, it attracted renewed attention 
with the emergence of mobile phones. In the late 1990’s the UK industry regulator 
claimed that the prices for calling mobile phones were too high. This triggered 
additional research. One of the findings was that the high prices stemmed from 
asymmetric incentives, where the originating party paid for the totality of the call. 
It was suggested that if instead the receivers were to pay for some or all of the call, 
mobile prices would be lower (Doyle and Smith, 1998). However, this might also 
lead to inverse effects. For instance, Schwarz-Schilling (2001) reports that the 
slower growth of mobile telephony in the US compared to other parts of the world 
could be attributed to the receiver pays principle. Exploring the “last mile” in the postal sector  page 3 
 
 
fixed plus a variable tariff. The first part of the tariff is a fixed participation 
fee that gives the right to  make and/or to receive calls. The second part 
represents the actual usage of the phone line. Typically, callers are charged 
some fee per time unit consumed. From an economic point of view a TPT 
makes sense when the suppliers face a large amount of fixed costs (e.g., to 
set up and operate a telecommunications network). It enables the operators 
to charge usage fees close to marginal costs without making a loss. The 
special feature of the telecommunications TPT is that both the sender and the 
receiver have to pay the fixed fee. Therefore, we do not have a pure sender 
pays principle (SSP) in the TPT, because the fixed part (the connection fee) 
is equally distributed among the two parties. Figure 1 will later illustrate the 
pricing scheme in comparison with other network industries. 
In  the  electricity  sector,  the  discussion  about  the  last  mile  is  less 
advanced, yet, at least in the beginning of the liberalization process, very 
similar  to  the  debate  in  the  telecommunications  sector.  With  the 
liberalization of energy production, local distributors remain monopolists in 
that they own the connection to the final consumer at the household level. 
Duplication  of  the  incumbent’s  last  mile  is  too  expensive.  Unlike  in  the 
telecommunications industry, no realistic technological alternative exists for 
local  power  distribution,  which  is  therefore  a  typical  example  of  a 
monopolistic bottleneck. Consequently, if consumers chose to purchase their 
electricity from a remote producer rather than from their local distributor, the 
local distributor is usually forced by the regulator to transport this electricity 
at a regulated access price. There exists a broad variety of pricing schemes 
for the final energy consumer, such as peak load pricing. Pricing schemes 
are mostly based on TPT and the receiver pays principle, as it is always the 
receiver who orders the power. Consequently, the receiver pays for both the 
power  consumption  (variable  tariff)  and  the  infrastructure  needed  to 
transport the power (fixed tariff). 
In the postal sector, the concept of the last mile is used above all by analogy. 
Taking up this analogy, the postal last mile resembles the current situation in 
the  telecommunications  rather  than  the  electricity  sector.  Although  mail 
delivery has the properties of a natural monopoly (subadditive cost function), 
it can hardly be seen as a monopolistic bottleneck: the experiences of New 
Zealand, Sweden and the Netherlands indicate that the natural monopoly of 
letters delivery is contestable. To some extent this questions the rationale for 
the ongoing European discussions about regulated access. With emerging 
parallel delivery networks one can indeed expect a greater variety of pricing 
schemes and product differentiation. Yet, surprisingly, pricing innovations 
with regard to the last mile remain rare. Today, virtually all postal services 
apply the sender pays principle (SPP), where receivers do not have to pay 
anything to be connected to the postal network.  Exploring the “last mile” in the postal sector  page 4 
 
 
The core idea of the following sections is to explore whether, as in the 
telecommunications  sector,  advanced  pricing  models  with  TPT,  RPP  and 
SPP elements would make sense in the postal sector both from a commercial 
and a welfare point of view.  
 
 
3.   THE UNIVERSAL DELIVERY OBLIGATION 
Historically, each European postal operator had its own definition and 
practice of the postal last mile. The EU Directive of 1997 (amended in 2002) 
states that the postal operator responsible for the universal postal service 
must  deliver  postal  items  “to the  home  premises”. However,  it  does  not 
specify a series of issues, such as the exact point of delivery; it does not say 
anything about the exact time of delivery during the day; and it does not 
mention whether or not the operator may charge last mile delivery fees (e.g., 
subscription fees to the households or specific door delivery fees). 
In other words, the European Commission allows for significant leeway 
when  it  comes  to  the  requirements  of  downstream  universal  service,  the 
”universal delivery obligation”. A more detailed analysis of what universal 
delivery  service  means  in  different  countries  shows  that,  while  there  is 
significant  similarity  in  delivery  frequency,  there  remain  differences 
regarding  delivery  point,  time,  and  quality.  Also,  many  countries  grant 
exceptions  to  the  obligation,  authorized  normally  by  the  regulator  or 
exceptionally by the political authorities. In the case of Switzerland, house 
delivery is the standard. Exceptions can be decided by Swiss Post, though 
they must be notified to the regulator. 
In conclusion, we can say that the downstream universal postal service 
and  the  pricing  of  this  service  as  conceived  from  a  political  perspective 
generally remain quite vague – i.e., defined only by “delivery to the home 




4.   TOWARDS DELIVERY PRICING 
Despite a number of structural similarities, it is the sender pays principle 
(SPP)
4 that prevails in the postal sector, whereas the Receiver-Pays-Principle 
(RPP) or Two-Part-Tariffs (TPT) have gained widespread acceptance in 
other network industries. In those industries, technological advances and 
liberalization typically lead to new services, differentiated quality standards, 
and the unbundling of the value chain. We also find price differentiation 
                                                 
4 The analogous term in the telecom industry is "calling party principle" CPP. Exploring the “last mile” in the postal sector  page 5 
 
 
with two or multi-part tariff schemes. This reflects growing competition, as 
well  as  demand  and  cost  considerations:  suppliers  make  use  of  market 
segmentation strategies with customer preferences being better reflected in 
the variety of product-price-bundles supplied. Generally, then, the presence 
of competition, along with high shares of fixed costs, leads to some sort of 
fixed access fee and variable usage prices. 
A brief, non-exhaustive look at the literature shows that a large number of 
variables  influences  the  choice  of  an  optimal  pricing  model.  In  the 
telecommunications  industry,  for  instance,  there  are  differences  between 
situations in which either party can initiate a message exchange and those in 
which  only  one  party  can  do  so.  Other  influencing  factors  are,  amongst 
others: number of messages sent and received which have the same value for 
the respective senders and receivers; receivers’ knowledge of the value of 
the message; degree of dependency between messages sent and received; 
cost  and  cost  relation  between  messages  sent  and  received.  Such  model 
features have important implications for the choice of the welfare optimizing 
pricing  model.  By  way  of  example,  if  an  incoming  message  triggers  an 
outgoing message of the same value in reply, then call externalities will be 
internalized  in  the  demand  for sending  messages,  if  not, then  a  two-part 
pricing  scheme  might  prove  welfare  optimizing.  There  are  a  number  of 
papers  analyzing  such  models.  One  important  conclusion  is  that  in  the 
presence  of  call  externalities  RPP  can  increase  both  welfare  and  profits 
(Hermalin and Katz (2004)
5.  
Looking at the postal industry, we know   of no case where RPP is 
currently in widespread use. We have to go back to the pre-Rowland Hill era 
to find RPP as a common means of payment
6. However, the topic has been 
taken up again in the recent past. Owen and Willig (1981) stated that postal 
rates  constitute  a  deviation  from  efficient  marginal  cost  pricing.  They 
proposed  setting  up  a  guaranteed  basic  service  delivery  and  pricing 
additional delivery services to the receivers according to demand. Schwarz -
Schilling discusses a number of reasons, among t hem “operational costs, 
transaction costs and the relevance of distributional goals”, for the fact that 
a two-part tariff (variable part SPP, fixed part RPP) “has never been put into 
practice on a significant scale so far” (2001:18). This conclusion relies on a 
                                                 
5 The results are, of course, subject to a number of model assumptions not discussed 
here. For further references see for example Jeon, Laffont and Tirole, 2004; Kim 
and Lim, 2000. 
6 For details on postal reform introducing the sender pays principle, see for example 
Hill and Hill, 1880. It is interesting to note that Hill proposed that a sma ll 
additional charge be made either in advance or  on delivery on the ground that, in 
some small places, the penny charge would not cover the cost of the delivery. 
However, he withdrew this suggestion later (Hemmeon, 1912). For a more recent 
discussion, see for example Crew and Kleindorfer, 1991. Exploring the “last mile” in the postal sector  page 6 
 
 
set of theoretical considerations, yet the paper does not model or quantify 
costs or revenues. 
Empirical  evidence  on  the  preference  of  receivers  to  pay  for  house 
delivery can be found in Elsenbast (1996). The author reports findings from 
a survey in which residents could choose between payable house delivery 
and free collection at a centralized P.O. box. He concluded – not surprisingly 
– that a majority (62%) of households preferred house delivery but – perhaps 
surprisingly – would, on average, also be prepared to pay for it. 
Thus, there are potentially a number of welfare arguments in favor of 
such a ”distributed two-part tariff”, reflecting that both the senders and the 
receivers bear the costs of a piece of mail: the former paying the postage and 
the latter a fixed delivery fee. In Figure 1, the new pricing is illustrated in 
comparison with selected other pricing schemes. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of different pricing schemes in network industries 
 
                   
  Telecom    Electricity/G
as 
  Post 1800    Posts today    Posts 
tomorrow? 
  SPP  RPP    SPP  RPP    SPP  RPP    SPP  RPP    SPP  RPP 
Variable Fee                             
Fixed Fee                             
 
The four key arguments supporting such a combination of RPP and SPP 
in contrast to the pure SPP as it is currently applied in the postal sector, can 
be summarized as follows. First, a two-part tariff scheme brings prices more 
in line with costs. Efficient pricing requires, in principle, that prices equal 
marginal cost. The postal network, though not a physical one, entails both 
fixed and variable costs. A large part of fixed costs can be associated with 
the  delivery.  Consequently,  introducing  a  fixed  and  a  variable  price 
component would allow postal rates to come closer to marginal costs and 
thus also to economically more efficient pricing. Secondly, each network 
transaction implies that the message has a value for both the sender and the 
receiver. Hence, both the sender and the receiver should contribute to the 
cost  of  a  message.  Thirdly,  a  receiver  contribution  would  allow  for  a 
reduction  of  the  sending  tariffs.  This,  in  turn,  would  stimulate  volumes, 
which would positively influence economies of scale. Fourth, yet related to 
the third argument, a new source of financing the USO could be tapped. 
From these four arguments we derive the following pricing model. The 
sender pays a variable fee for the mail sent. This includes collection, sorting, 
and  transportation  to  easily  accessible, low-cost  locations. These  may  be 
centralized P.O. boxes at the post office, but also at, for instance, the city 




7. The receiver pays a fixed fee for any additional request, such as 
daily delivery to the doorstep
8. 
The model can be used to varying degrees to cope with heterogeneity  in 
delivery costs, which is the main cause of unsustainability of the USO in the 
face of entry. In other words, the model needs not to be applied to every 
address. Also, the model opens up a number of further options for service 
delivery. Receivers may wish to get their mail at the road intersection, at the 
house entrance, or at the doorstep, and pay differentiated prices accordingly. 
Moreover, once delivery is packaged and priced as a product in its own right, 
many additional features can be added, for in stance in combination with 
redirecting mail, with different times of delivery, or in conjunction with 
electronic services. Yet, whatever model the postal operators offer to the 
households, it must be non-discriminatory.   
In the remainder of the paper, we will focus on a stylized and simplified 
model as depicted in Figure 2. 
 




5.   MODEL AND CALIBRATION 
Our aim is to evaluate whether a combination of the SPP with the RPP 
performs better than the current SPP on its own, in terms of both operators’ 
profits  and  overall  welfare.  We  restrict  ourselves  to  the  study  of  the 
monopoly situation to reduce complexity. 
Our model develops as follows. In the benchmark case, the SPP applies 
as it is today. Thus, the receiver does not pay for delivery. We compare this 
benchmark with the stylized distributed TPT as in Figure 2, which we call 
“Delivery Flat Rate” (DFR). The name “Delivery Flat Rate” stems from the 
fact that the receivers have to pay a yearly flat rate (P) to the postal operator 
if they want delivery at the doorstep. In other words, in order to receive the 
mail at the doorstep, the receiver has to pay  P units of money per year. 
                                                 
7 A P.O. box is not necessarily located within a post office. P.O. boxes may also 
consist of large units with many individual delivery boxes. These units are located 
at places which are easy to reach for both the post office and the recipients who 
come to pick up their mail. 
8 Note that receivers who are not willing to pay a “connection” fee are not cut off 
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Receiver 1: Pays monthly 
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Nevertheless, customers also have the option of receiving the mail for free at 
a P.O. box (located at a nearby post office or another centralized location). 
The DFR will allow the operator to reduce delivery costs and to have 
additional revenues (revenues associated with the flat rate that customers 
have to pay if they choose to receive lettermail at the doorstep). The operator 
can redistribute these additional revenues to the senders by decreasing the 
senders’ price accordingly.  
If receivers are not willing to pay the delivery fee and choose P.O. box 
delivery instead, they incur an opportunity cost (OC) of going to the P.O. 
box  to  collect  the  incoming  mail.  We  assume  OC  to  be  a  function  of 
household income w, the search costs s to realize the opportunity income, 
and of time t, needed to go from the household’s doorstep to empty the P.O. 
box: 
 
  s t w t w OC   
  ) , ( , 
   
where α and β expresses the way customers value the opportunity money 
and  time.  Economic  theory  would  state  these  two  parameters  to  be  1. 
However, many factors are not directly covered in our opportunity function. 
For example, one could argue that the opportunity cost of going to the P.O. 
box  also  depends  on  the  size  of  the  household,  on  whether  at  least  one 
member passes the point of centralized delivery each day, on age or health 
conditions  of  the  members  of  the  household,  on  whether  the  household 
receives newspapers separately from the rest of the mail, or on the number of 
mail pieces per day. It would be rather complex and arbitrary to introduce all 
these variables into our model. The two parameters α and β give us some 
flexibility  to  get  an  intuitive  OC-distribution  that  corresponds  to  surveys 
made in Germany,
 as found in Elsenblast (1996).  
The decision of the customer will depend on whether his opportunity cost 
of going to the P.O. box is smaller or bigger than the flat rate P he has to pay 
for delivery at the doorstep. If OC P  , then the customer will prefer to pay 
the  flat  rate  and  receive  the  mail  at  his  doorstep.  If  OC P  ,  P.O.  box 
delivery is chosen instead.  
In order to analyze the welfare effects of the new DFR policy, we need to 
specify utility functions for senders and receivers, and a profit function for 
the postal service. For the sender side we follow De Donder et. al. (2001) 






S      
2
2




where q represents the quantity of mail sent, p is the price per piece of 
mail the sender has to pay, and   is the initial endowment of the customer. 
a,  b  >  0  determine  the market  size  and  the  slope  of  the  demand  curve. 
pq    reflects  the  amount  of  money  the  consumer  spends  on  all  other 




( ) ( ) q p a p
b
 .              
 
For the receiving households  I i  1   we assume a constant individual 
utility Vi of being connected to the postal network. Thus, their (quasilinear) 
utility  in  the  monopoly  case  is  Vi.  In  the  DFR  case,  they  are  worse  off 
because  delivery  is  costly  now.  Thus,  in  order  to  receive  mail  at  the 
doorstep, the receivers need to pay the delivery flat rate P. If they choose the 
P.O. box instead, their cost is OCi. Total receivers’ utility can be written as 
 
    
i
i i
R OC P V P U ) , min( ) ( .  (1) 
 
Expression (1) offers an explanation why, so far, no postal operator has 
chosen  DFR.  If Vi is smaller than the cost of receiving  mail, one would 
expect this person not to empty the P.O. box at all. We do not implement this 
possibility  in  our  model  by  assuming  that  Vi  is  sufficiently  large.  Thus, 
everybody  will  be  motivated  to  empty  their  mail  box,  and  no  network 
externalities are lost.  
The  postal  service’s  costs  are  composed  of  both  variable  and  fixed 
components,  reflecting  the  existence  of  economies  of  scale  in  the  mail 
processing. The profit function of the postal operator accordingly looks as 
follows: 
 
              
DFR for     terms Additional
) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ˆ ( ) , ˆ ( P AC P n P P n N F F F q c p P p PO d u           . 
Parameter c denotes the variable costs per mail item, and Fu and Fd are 
the upstream and downstream fixed costs. FPO are the operator’s fixed costs 
for providing and billing an additional P.O. box. N is the total number of 
households  in  the  economy,  and  n(P)  is  the  number  of  households  who 
choose delivery at the doorstep as a function of the flat rate P. Consequently, 
N-n(P)  represents  the  number  of  households  abandoning  home  delivery 
because the flat rate exceeds their opportunity costs for a self-service at the Exploring the “last mile” in the postal sector  page 10 
 
 
centralized point of delivery. AC(P) are the avoided costs as a function of the 
flat rate P. In the benchmark case, P is zero and AC(P) = 0. If the flat rate 
was set to plus infinity in the DFR case, nobody would choose doorstep 
delivery and AC(P) = Fd. We assume that the postal operator redistributes all 
earnings and savings which are associated with the new policy to the senders 
by  lowering  the  stamp  price  from  p0  to  p ˆ   according  to  the  rule 
0
) ( )) ( ( ) (
0 ˆ q
P AC P n N F P n P PO p p
      , where q0 is the mail volume of the previous 
period.  
Figure  3  provides  additional  intuition  for  the  underlying  cost 
assumptions. Following Cohen and Chu (1997), delivery costs can be split 
into three parts, i.e., ”route costs”, ”access costs”, and ”load costs”. Load 
costs are the costs of inserting the mail into the mailbox once the mail carrier 
reaches the mailbox. The profit function implies that we assume the load 
cost of a P.O. and mail box to be the same. These costs are included in c. 
Thus, only route and access cost are avoided when consumers switch to P.O. 
boxes. The total of route and access costs represent Fd.  
 
Figure 3: Main cost drivers in delivery 
 
 
In order to compute overall welfare in the economy, we simply add up 
consumers’  net  utility  and  operator’s  profit.  For  DFR,  we  can  find  the 
consumers’ net utility by subtracting the revenues associated with the flat 
rate  and  the  total  disutility  of  going  to  the  P.O.  box  from  the  senders’ 
surplus. 
With this framework, we will have a positive mail volume impact for any 
negative value of price elasticity as long as FPO(N – n) < AC + nP. This is 
because  we  assume  that  the  postal  operator  redistributes  earnings  and 
savings entirely to the senders by lowering the stamp price p. With negative 
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translates into greater overall welfare depends on the avoided cost function 
and  the  switching  behavior  of  the  consumers,  as  determined  by  the 
distribution of OC in the population.  
In order to assess the impact on welfare, we calibrate the model using 
Swiss data. Swiss Post stated in its annual report that approximately 2.86 
billion pieces of addressed mail were delivered in 2004. Recent Swiss Post 
data suggest that overall price elasticity is approximately -0.3. Parameters a 
and b can be directly computed using prices, quantities and price elasticities 




  . 
 
On the production side, we assume the same calibration as set out in Dietl 
et al. (2005). We estimate the operator’s yearly outlay for a P.O. box (FPO) to 
be  CHF  35.  A  crucial  point  is  the  avoided  cost  function.  The  function 
reflects how delivery costs depend on the fraction of consumers choosing 
P.O. boxes instead of mailboxes. We assume a function of the following 
kind: 
 
Graph 1: Avoided cost function 












Total avoided costs break down into the two parts ”avoided access costs” 
and ”avoided route costs” (see Figure 3). When a consumer switches to P.O. 
box delivery, the postal operator saves the access costs directly. These costs 
are  related  to  the  time  the  carrier  saves  with  regard  to  reaching  the 
consumer’s mailbox from the prevailing route. This component is a linear 
function. The second component is the reduced route time, also called route 
Fraction of Fd 
 
Fraction of households preferring doorstep delivery   
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costs.  Route  time  decreases  when  a  sufficient  fraction  of  households 
switches to P.O. boxes and delivery routes can be optimized accordingly. 
We assume an exponential run of this curve.  
In  order  to  compute  the  distribution  of  opportunity  costs,  we  have 
generated a random sample of 10,000 observations for each of the variables 
w and t. We assumed the households’ income and distance from the P.O. box 
to  be  independent  and  to  follow  the  lognormal  distribution  with  the 
following means and standard deviations
9: 
 
Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of w and t 
  Mean  Std deviation 
w (CHF)  8.933  3.507 
t (minutes)  8.78  2.48 
 
Moreover, we assumed s = CHF 150, α = 1 and β to be 0.7. Graph 2 
depicts the resulting demand function for doorstep delivery. 
 







0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%




                                                 
9 Data supplied by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and by Swiss Post. 
Flate rate P in CHF per year 
 
Percentage of population preferring doorstep delivery   
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6.   RESULTS 
It is a straightforward task to analyze the benchmark situation, i.e., the 
first stage before the introduction of the flat rate for doorstep delivery. The 
uniform price charged by Swiss Post was CHF 0.74 on average. The model 
yields a profit of CHF 196 million, a consumer surplus of approximately 
CHF 3.4 billion. and total welfare of about CHF 3.6 billion. 
If the new policy of delivery were introduced with a delivery flat rate of 
CHF  100  per  year,  without  taking  into  account  the  costs  of  centralized 
delivery  boxes  for  the  operator  (FPO=0)  and  assuming  that  the  postal 
operator  applied  an  extensive  redistribution  of  savings  and  earnings,  the 
average price would drop by CHF 0.09 to CHF 0.65. Reduced prices would 
cause growing demand and accordingly increase operators’ profit by CHF 44 
million. Simultaneously consumer welfare would increase by 10% and total 
welfare by approximately 11%. Table 2 summarizes the results. 
 
Table 2: Results for different flat rates, FPO = 0 
  Before 
flat rate 
After flat rate (CHF) 
  40  70  100  130  160 
Demand for doorstep delivery (%)  100  82  68  53  40  28 
Average price (CHF)  0.74  0.69  0.67  0.65  0.63  0.62 
Quantity (million letters)  2782  2837  2867  2889  2905  2920 
Consumers’ surplus (CHF million)  3423  3614  3707  3769  3816  3867 
Profit operator (CHF million)  196  221  233  240  245  250 
Total welfare (CHF million)  3619  3835  3940  4009  4061  4117 
Welfare change (in %)    6.0  8.9  10.8  12.2  13.7 
 
In the Graph 3, we can observe how consumer welfare and operator’s 
profit evolve for different values of the flat rate.  
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Assuming a flat rate of CHF 100 per year, we can see that irrespective of 
parameter  α  we  will  observe  an  increase  in  total  welfare  with  the 
introduction of the flat rate (Table 3). All the remaining results are robust 
with regards to changes in α. 
 
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis for   
  Before 
flat rate 
Flat rate = CHF 100 per year  
α 
  0.8  0.9  1  1.1  1.2 
Demand for doorstep delivery (%)  100  28  41  53  65  74 
Average price (CHF)  0.74  0.64  0.65  0.65  0.64  0.64 
Quantity (million letters)  2782  2899  2889  2889  2892  2896 
Consumers’ surplus (CHF million)  3423  3893  3802  3769  3764  3770 
Profit operator (CHF million)  196  243  240  240  241  242 
Total welfare (CHF million)  3619  4136  4042  4009  4005  4012 
Welfare change (in %)    14.3  11.7  10.8  10.7  10.9 
 
So far, we have assumed that the provision of P.O. boxes was costless for 
the operator (FPO = 0). Because of the redistribution of additional earnings 
and savings to the senders, this resulted in higher welfare whenever the flat 
rate was increased. In other words, there is no economic reason for doorstep 
delivery with this calibration of the model. Graphs 4 and 5 show, however, 
how the results change if we take into account that the postal operator incurs 
the costs of building/providing an increasing number of P.O. boxes.  
 

















































We now have a local maximum in overall welfare. This represents the 
point where an increase in the flat rate causes too many receivers to switch 
to P.O. box delivery. For about FPO > CHF 50, the local maximum exceeds 
the border solution. In this case, the local maximum would equal the welfare 
maximizing  delivery  flat  rate.  To  the  right  of  the  local  maximum, 
exponential savings in route cost (cf. Graph 1) cause a local minimum.  Exploring the “last mile” in the postal sector  page 15 
 
 
However, the results should be treated with caution. One reason is the 
calibration of the demand function in Graph 2, which is more optimistic than 
the results from Elsenbast (1996) indicate. If one is thinking seriously about 
introducing a flat rate in Switzerland, the demand function should be derived 
empirically  and  matched  with  the  corresponding  demand  parameters. 
Furthermore,  the  availability  of  P.O.  boxes  is  probably  not  a  linearly 
increasing function as implicitly assumed with the fixed provision cost per 
P.O. box.  
 
 
7.   CONCLUSIONS 
Our purpose was to investigate and discuss a paradigm change in the 
postal value chain. We considered the question as to whom the bill for the 
service  of  the  last  mile should be  presented, and explored the  impact of 
combining the ”Receiver Pays Principle” (RPP) with the traditional “Sender 
Pays Principle” (SPP) on welfare. 
Our analysis leads us to the conclusion that a combination of RPP with 
SPP in the form of a modified two-part tariff increases overall welfare, in 
particular when the additional earnings and savings are redistributed to the 
senders. We predict an increase in mail demand, which is due to a decrease 
in the average stamp price stemming from the redistribution of the flat rate to 
the  senders.  Our  results  are  based  on  the  calibration  of  the  demand  for 
doorstep  delivery  and  on  the  fact  that  we  assumed  a  linearly  increasing 
function for the availability of P.O. boxes. Accordingly, it is crucial to learn 
more about customers’ perceived values and their buying patterns regarding 
last mile service options. Also, the implications of the introduction of RPP in 
a competitive environment must be further investigated. 
However, the model opens the doors for mass customization in the last 
mile of the postal value chain. It is a starting point for seeing the recipient as 
a customer. Service bundles could be gradually and flexibly tailored and 
priced to recipients’ needs. Incentives and decision making for service levels 
in the last mile would ultimately be transferred to those who expect and 
appreciate  good  services.  Furthermore,  the  model  provides  a  new  and 
promising option for financing the universal service obligation – or, more 
precisely,  the  universal  delivery  obligation  –  of  postal  operators  without 
abandoning the principle of solidarity between regions. Finally, RPP could 
be a suitable means of escaping from the dreaded “graveyard spiral” when it 
comes  to  a  decline  of  mail  demand.  Thus,  RPP  could  help  tackling  the 
challenges that postal operators will increasingly face in the future. 
A  number  of  questions  remain  unanswered,  though.  We  hope  to  see 
postal experts launching supplementary surveys in order to help understand 
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